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Abstract
The motivation of this article is to induce the bank capital management solution
for banks and regulation bodies on commercial bank. The goal of the paper is
intended to mitigate the risk of banking area and also provide the right incentive
for banks to support the real economy.
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Part I
Introduction
In Europe, After the Basel 1 (1988) capital accord, Basel 2 (1999) and Basel 3
(2010) have been evolved. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision(BCBS) , advised about credit risk (1988.07) at the Basel 1 and
amended about market risk (1996.01) with the Basel 1 Amendment. In the
revised framework of Basel 2, operational risk (2004.06) was introduced and
enhanced at the Basel 3 (2010.12). Because these Basel Capital Rules have
been enhanced up to the Basel 3, for example, the scope of operational risk is
enlarged. Banks face the situation to manage the cost to follow banking
capital regulation rules. Contrary to banks, the government needs to regulate
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banks to prevent panic from the systemic banking crisis.
It is not big surprising that the government tries to stop the bank run in the
early time to prevent a cascading failure. The impact of bank runs on
economy is huge. This is the same with the Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
observation of large costs imposed on the U.S. economy by bank runs in the
1930s. Upon on much more recent data, in systemically important banking
crises in the world from 1970 to 2007, the average net recapitalization cost to
the government was 6% of GDP, fiscal costs associated with crisis management
averaged 13% for GDP (16% of GDP if expense recoveries are ignored), and
economic output losses averaged about 20% of GDP during the first four years
of the crisis. Otherwise, if the government decides to adopte the Basel capital
regulation framework, the adoption cost will influence the economy of country.
Either household or banks, related parties to economy should pay for the Basel
capital regulation as the preventive method in the banking business cycle. An
OECD study released on 17 February 2011, estimated that the medium term
impact of Basel III implementation on GDP growth would be in the range of
0.05% to 0.15% per year. Economic output would be mainly affected by an
increase in bank lending spreads, as banks pass a rise in bank funding costs,
due to higher capital requirements, to their customers. Therefore, the situation
is that banks are struggling to manage the regulation cost and the government
wants to defend about the contagion of nationwide economic problem.
Part II
Risks on the balance sheet and
off the balance sheet
In the systemic risk, we can measure the risk impacting on other factors like
firms, households and federal reserve banks, not on commercial banks. Easily,
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monetary policy on banking considers the systemic risk. We need to consider
different measures to analyse systemic risk of banks with domino effects,
contagions. Systemic risk of banks can be explained in the static model within
the general equilibrium. Otherwise, domino effects or contagions should be
described as movements having the future tendency. Scope of regulation should
be detected by categorization of on balance sheet and off balance sheet factors.
Risks on the balance sheet of bank are divided into credit risk, market risk,
liquidity risk and systemic risk. Asset risks faced by a bank are credit risk and
market risk. Credit risk is the risk that a borrower will default on any type of
debt by failing to make required payments. Market risk is the risk of losses in
positions arising from movements in market prices. In case of liquidity risk ,
there are two major situations. One is emergency capacity of banks. When an
illiquidity event takes place, an affected bank typically must borrow funds at
interest rates exceeding those paid by other institution. Another is about the
stability of the banking system in case of inducing large numbers of depositors
to seek withdrawals. I would say liquidity risk closing to the demand deposit
matter is on the balance sheet of bank. Credit, market and liquidity risk is on
an individual basis but system risk is a negative externality or an adverse
spillover effect stemming from transaction in which they were not participants.
Distinguished from credit risk containing sovereign risk (government risk),
counterparty risk (unincorporated entities risk exposed to financial risk,
usually referring to governments, national banks), systemic risk is the risk of
collapse of an entire financial system or entire market, as opposed to risk
associated with any one individual entity, group or component of a system.
George G. Kaufman and Kenneth E. Scott (2003) define ”systemic risk” in
imprecise terms:
”Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire
system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components, and is
evidenced by comovements (correlation) among most or all the parts.”
Darryll Hendricks (2009), who is a practitioner, suggests a more theoretical
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definition from the sciences in which the term originated:
”A systemic risk is the risk of a phase transition from one equilibrium to
another, much less optimal equilibrium, characterized by multiple
self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms making it difficult to reverse.”
Banks engage in a number of activities that yield income and entail expenses
and risks which are not directly influencing their balance sheets. In particular,
banks extend loan commitments, security loans and trade derivative securities.
Through extended loan commitments, the borrower has a guarantee of credit
at a given interest rate whenever desired during the specific period. The bank
receives interest income on the portion of the credit line that the borrower
draws upon, and the bank receives non interest fee income on the unused
portion. Whereas a loan commitment obligates a bank to bring a loan onto its
balance sheet upon a customers request, securitization permits a bank to
remove loans from a balance sheet. Trading derivative securities also proved to
be significant source of revenues. This claim is supported by the survey of
David Van Hoose (2010), by the end of 2008, U.S. banks held a notional
amount of derivatives totally more than 190 trillion dollar, of which about 150
trillion dollar of derivatives exposure was comprised of interest rate contracts.
Part III
Model
1. Saving preference of Consumers
Microeconomics theory of banking could not exist before the foundations of
the economics of information were laid in the early 1970s. We can start with
the simple general equilibrium model containing a banking sector under the
complete financial markets. (Arrow 1953)
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The two-period model (t = 0, 1, 2,) with a unique physical good initially owned
by the consumers in the economy in which a continuum of ex-ante identical
agents is each endowed with one unit of good at period t = 0, and this good is
to be consumed at periods t = 1 and t = 2.
The consumer chooses her consumption profile (C1, C2), and the allocation of
her savings S between bank deposits Dh and securities
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , in a way
that maximize her utility function u under her budget constraints:
Max u(C1, C2)
C1 +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s +D
h + Sh −
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s −Dh = ω1
C2 = Πf +Πb+(1+r)
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s +(1+rD)D
h+(1+rh)Sh−(1+r)
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s
−(1 + rD)Dh
where ω1 for her initial endowment of the consumption good, Πf+Πb for
respectively the profits of the firm and of the bank (distributed to the
consumer-stockholder at t = 2). Bh denotes for securities, Dh for bank
deposits. Sh denotes for savings. r, rD, rh are the interest rates paid by
securities, deposits and savings. For each future state of the world s (s ∈ ω)
one can determine the price Ps of the contingent claim that pays one unit of
account in state s and nothing otherwise.
The consumer has a well-defined set of desires (”preference”), which can be
represented by a numerical utility function. In addition, we assume that the
consumer chooses optimally, in the sense that they choose the option with the
highest utility of those available to them. It implies that a consumer is solving
an optimization problem. An optimization problem has three key components.
a. The Objects of Choice The consumer chooses her consumption profile
(C1, C2) and allocation of her savings Sh between bank deposits Dh and
securities Bhs . If the real asset Sh −Dh −Bhs is non-negative, it implies the
real asset is sufficient to support the operation of household.
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b. The Objective function The consumer maximizes her utility function u.
u is assumed to be increasing and concave. Notice that preferences are state
contingent and do not fit the standard Von Neumann-Morgenstern
representation.
c. Constraints
Cash-in-advance 0 < Dh ≤ ω1, The paper will be based on the
Cash-in-advance constraint. This approach which was introduced by Clower
(1967) is the requirement that each consumer or firm must have sufficient cash
available before they can buy goods.
Price of security h under Uncertainty
∑
PsB
h
s (resp.
∑
s∈Ω PsB
f
s ,∑
s∈Ω PsB
b
s) implies the price of securities by the absence of arbitrage
opportunities. A bank issues (or buys) a security h (interpreted as a deposit or
a loan) characterized by the array Bhs (s ∈ Ω) (resp.Bfs , Bbs) of each payoff in
all future states of world ω
Interior Solution The consumer’s program (Ph) has an interior solution only
when the interest rates are equal: r=rD
Preference of Savings In the Arrow-Debreu model, money is redundant in the
market. Households are indifferent about the composition of savings. In the
paper, the househould has preference to increase the budget to collect savings
Sh and affected by risk level of securities, deposit and real asset. Savings Sh is
the sum of Securities
∑
PsB
h
s , Deposits Dh, Real Asset Sh − (
∑
PsB
h
s +Dh)
There are concerns about savings which is substituted into consumption by
the household like Covas-Fujuta (2010). Diaz (2005) adds no capital
requirement at the basics to reduce consumption and increase savings by the
household. Haslag (2001) assumed that return to money is positively related
to the money growth rate which is random variable, the gross real returns to
savings is random. His realized gross real return to savings indicates that the
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gross real return to savings is a weighted sum of capital and flat money (which
derives its value from government regulation or law, so called as ’flat
currency’). The weight is the share of the agent’s asset shares.
In the Waller model (2004), Saving is very passively selected by the household
depending upon decision at the previous period. The middle-aged agents have
already earned their wage income, as the wage during period t was determined
by the previous period’s interest rates (level of the capital stock). They have
also already decided how much to consume and save (since savings is a fixed
fraction of wage income), but they have not yet decided how to allocate their
savings between capital and flat currency. what these middle aged agents want
at this point is just the highest possible interest rate between period t and
t+ 1, so that they can obtain the best possible return on their savings and can
thus consume as much as possible during their period of old age. In the third
period of life, the agents retire, consume their savings and exit the model.
Practically, Christensen-Meh-Moran (2011, Bank of Canada) mentioned, at
the timing of events, households deposit savings in banks, who use these funds
as well as their own net worth to finance entrepreneur projects. In the
investment frame, exiting (failing to return from the project) agents sell their
capital for consumption goods, surviving agents buy this capital as part of
their consumption-savings decision.
However, in reality, even though the agent has the housing, they need to spend
expenditure for renting, maintenance, extension of housing. Savings and real
asset portion are large enough to make the loan from banks. It is hard to
explain price fluctuation of housing and savings on the economy is just
depending upon the interest rate of capital stock and deposit or perfect
substitution of consumption. For households, the preference of savings is
concerns about existence of household economy making future benefits and
directly affecting to the welfare of each individual.
House price appreciation by the model of Goodhart-Kashrap-Tsomocos (2012)
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is impressive. Reducing the deposit defaults induces more savings circulated
by the bank and less self-insurance and by the end, the reduction in
self-insurance reduces the housing for sale in the good state, which means that
house price appreciation in the boom is higher than otherwise. Most of all, the
market incompleteness with the deadweight costs of default distort the
housing market. Wealthy agents endowed with houses make their savings
decisions accounting for the possibility that deposit will not be fully repaid.
When default penalties for banks are low, then the households internalize that
risk putting less wealth into the banking system and hold more in the form of
housing. This choice increases the supply of housing that is available in boom,
which lowers house prices and raise welfare for the agents entering the housing
market at that time. To insure that house prices fall in the bad state of the
world, house holds P and F are also presumed to have lower wealth. Likewise,
the non-bank is endowed with lower capital in period 1 as well as in the bad
state of the world. This model describes the housing bubble phenomenon
interestingly.
In the model of Lucas (1995), to support the incompleteness of market, he
pointed out savings that the young split their savings between bank deposits,
which promise a fixed nominal return, and bank equity, which yields an
uncertain real dividend. In addition, because a constant fraction of initial
wealth is saved, there is no distortion due to fixed nominal interest payments
on deposits; Hence regardless of deposits, bank equity is related to the real
effect of monetary policy.
In the paper, at the frame work of securities, deposits and real assets with
savings, Firstly, the relation between savings and real asset (especially
housing) can be much more attached. Secondly, deposit included in the total
saving amount which is escaped from the one-sided thinking that deposit is
equal to savings and can be perfectly substituted to consumption. Thirdly,
Securities at uncertainty is affecting to the investment portfolio of household.
These dynamics are supported by the following empirical data.
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The deposit amount traded is different depending upon factor composition of
economic models. For example, the European Central Bank announces the
Euro areas’ deposit amounts for the 4th quarter in 2013 in the Euro areas.
Gross saving amount of households is 2521.3 billion euros (growth rate: 2.4).
Deposits by non-financial corporations are 1870.7 billion euros. (growth rate:
6.7). Deposits by Insurance corporations and pension funds (financial
intermediaries) are 653.2 billion euros. (growth rate: -5.3). Deposits by other
financial intermediaries are 1854.1 billion euros (growth rate -3.1). Deposits by
government are 440.8 billion euros (growth rate: -1.8). Deposits by non-euro
area residents are 2522.9 billion euros (growth rate: -11.2). Therefore,
Without consideration about deposits by non-financial corporations (1870.7),
the comparison between deposits by household (2521.3) and deposits by
financial intermediaries (653.2+1854.1=2507.3) is naive explanation.
Loans for house purchase is 3858.1 billion euros. (growth rate: 0.7). It is
Long-term liability affecting the existence of household economy. and the total
(7341.7) of deposits by insurance corporations and pension funds (653.2, -5.3),
other financial intermediaries (1854.1, -3.1), non-financial corporations are
(1870.7), government (440.8) and non-euro area residents (2522.9) and total
(7752.2) of deposits by household (2521.3, 2.4) and Loans for house purchase
(3858.1, 0.7) and other loans (796.7, -1.6), consumer credit (576.1, -3.0).
(billion euros, growth rate)
Loans for house purchase insurance corporations and pension funds
(3858.1, 0.7) (653.2, -5.3)
other loans (796.7, -1.6) other financial intermediaries (1854.1, -3.1)
consumer credit non-financial corporations are (1870.7, 6.7)
(576.1, -3.0) government (440.8, -1.8)
non-euro area residents (2522.9, -11.2)
7341.7 7752.2
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Savings Sh is the sum of Securities
∑
PsB
h
s , Deposits Dh, Real Asset
Sh − (
∑
PsB
h
s +Dh). Households try to control the balance of asset and
liability because in the situation of uncertainty, to maintain enough Deposits
Dh for the economic existence of household, household needs to invest on
securities as of
∑
PsB
h
s posed on uncertainty conditions. Mainly, Real Asset
implies the budget for housing which can afford to manage the residence and
invested real asset. For example, if the household has an apartment and there
is the redundancy after spending the investment on securities and deposits, it
can be the maintenance fee for house decoration or big furniture.
The importance of portion for housing is considerable. Otherwise, if Real asset
is negative, hence, the savings of household is less than the amount of
securities and deposits. Even though, the amount of operation in the
household is enough with the securities and deposits. In the conservatism on
the housing budget, we can consider the effect on the housing. In the paper,
Housing in the household is considered as the future economic asset which
supports each member of household to make productions.
2. Borrowing composition of Firms
The firm chooses its investment level I and its financing (through real asset
Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsBh, liabilities to bank Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsBh − Lfr (or Liabilities to
central bank Lfr) in a way that maximizes its profit:
Max Πf (Pf )
Πf=f(I) + rf (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s )− rLBank(Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Lfr)− rLfrLfr
I = Sh=Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s
Where f denotes the production function of the representative firm. rf is the
premium of firm real asset. rLBank , rLfr is the interest rate on bank loans and
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federal reserve bank loan. Dh denotes for bank deposits. Bh denotes for
securities. Especially Bfr denotes for securities of federal reserve banks. Lfr is
loan claimed by the firm to the federal reserve bank. For each future state of
the world s (s ∈ ω) one can determine the price Ps of the contingent claim
that pays one unit of account in state s and nothing otherwise. I is the
investment level and Sh denotes for savings.
Interior Solution Pf has an interior solution only when: rf = rLBank = rLfr
In the Modigliani-Miller theorem, firms are indifferent about the composition
of borrowings. In the paper, firms have preference to maintain the Real Asset
Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s . Regardless of equilibrium, firms prefer to loan from central
bank (so called as bond) than commercial banks because it’s kinds of
investment and borrowing. Among the Dh and
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , firms prefer to
have Dh because of financial stability and certainty preference.
At the firm problem, we have ambiguity about change of firms because of
investment or loan status. In the paper, the relation with the commercial
banks and central banks is focused. In the general equilibrium, firms choose
labor cost and manage the capital for production or business process but labor
effect is hard to be analysed with commercial banks and federal banks. Hence,
the transaction like loan movement (i.e. liabilities to banks, liabilities to
central banks, investment) can be selected to explain in this paper.
Additionally, Investment is regarded as Real asset to support existence of
business entities. It implies firms want to acquire investment budget to
maintain the real asset which can be requisite for existence of firms. Therefore,
by having borrowing preference to have much more stability between liabilities
to banks and central banks (so called as bonds), firms pursue to obtain
stability to acquire the investment up to the stability of Investment which can
be equal to the Real Asset. so we can explain the dynamics of investment and
loan with the firm’s property.
There are many argues to explain the ambiguity of firms with informational
11
asymmetry, shock absorbed by effective capital, securities, technical shocks,
and interest rate on loans and the borrowing constraint.
Boyd-Chang-Smith (2004) points out two informational asymmetry problems
of firms: The moral hazard problem arises because any borrower’s project
choice is not observable. Also, The costly state verification (CSV) problem
arises because, for either type of project, the investment return cannot be
freely observed by any agent other than the project owner.
In the Nelson-Pinter (2012) model, at the production function of cobb-douglas
standard form, there is a shock variable to the quality of physical capital.
When we face the unanticipated exogenous declines in the productive capacity
of physical capital, ”Effective capital” available for use in the production is
diminished. This intends to consider effect on banks since banks hold claims
on physical capital directly on their balance sheets, this will be losses for
banks, which must be absorbed or passed on to outside creditors.
In the Dewartripont-tirole (2012) model, he argues that securities are
characterized not only by income rights but also by control rights. Optimal
corporate choices are time inconsistent, investors in control of corporate
choices must face an incentive that differs from firm-value maximization. so a
banking manager has no financial resources to cover an investment cost and
turns to investors for financing. The capital structure-that is, the allocation
among investors of contingent cash-flow and control rights-is designed at this
financial stage.
Covas Fujita (2010) mentioned that the technology shock is distributed as
standard normal distribution. Labor and capital rental markets are assumed
to be competitive.
Diaz (2005) thinks that since interest rate on loans is greater or equal than the
discount rate, firms prefer to use internal sources (i.e. cash flows) rather than
external financing. and he induces that capital depreciation is paid out of
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firm’s cash flow and net investment is entirely financed with debt. In the
model of Nuno-Thomas (2013), they assumed that the firm can only borrow
from banks located on the same island.
In the static model of general equilibrium, if we know the GDP endowment
as the exogenous factor, we can calculate more at the firm’s problem Indeed,
GDP analysis like Consumption to GDP, Government Expenditure to GDP,
Fixed Capital Formation to GDP, Export to GDP, Net Export to GDP, Money
to GDP except for inflation rate and nominal interest rate are used with the
general equilibrium model.
3. Demand Deposit of Bank
Scope of Bank Domestically chartered commercial banks, country branches
and agencies of foreign banks, Edge Act corporation
The bank chooses its supply of loans to firms Dh +Bfr − Lfr, its demand for
deposits Dh, and the borrowing Bfr − Lfr in a way that maximized its profit:
Max Πb (Pb)
Πb = rLBank(Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Lfr)− rLfr(
∑
s∈Ω PsB
fr
s − Lfr)− rDDh
Where rLBank , rLfr is the interest rate on bank loans and federal reserve bank
loan. Dh denotes for bank deposits. rD is the interest rate paid by deposits
Bhs denotes for securities. Especially B
fr
s denotes for securities of federal
reserve banks. Lfr is loan claimed by the firm to the federal reserve bank.
The bank maximizes the profit by choosing its supply of loans L+, its demand
for deposits D− and the issuance
∑
s∈Ω Ps B
b
s
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Max Πb (Pb)
Πb = rLL+ + r
∑
s∈Ω PsB
b
s − rDD− L+ =
∑
s∈Ω PsB
b
s +D
−
Until now, the main issue has been to handle the demand deposit in the
banking area and it related to money support closely. In the data of Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, demand deposit and money stock
data have been collected from Demand Deposit, Currency and Related items
(J.3, Semi monthly) in 1960 to Money Stock Measures in 2012.
Under the fractional reserve banking, deposit is important indicator for
economy because of money multiplier effect. In the formula of
moneysupply = currency + deposits, demand deposit which has highest
liquidity among deposits on the balance sheet of banks is directly related to
the M1 of central banks. Diamond and Dybvig model (1983) explains why
bank runs occur at an undesirable equilibrium and why banks issue demand
deposits that are more liquid than their assets by providing better risk sharing
among people who need to consume at different random times. The key to
describe the rationality both for the existence of banks and for their
vulnerability to runs is the illiquidity of assets, especially by the demand
deposit. His conclusion on the bank runs as better indicator of economic
distress than money supply is too quick because there is the duplicated section
of deposits and money supply. A bank run is the sudden withdrawal of
deposits of just one bank and money supply contains the currency section.
In case of bank runs, the government of country should prepare the recovery
solution for economy. Regularly, given information about money supply, the
government can figure out about both moving of currency and deposits.
Krugman (2006) points this out that deposits are usually considered part of
the narrowly defined money supply, as they can be used, via checks and drafts,
and a means of payment for goods and services and to settle debts. The
money supply of a country is usually held to consist of currency plus demand
deposits. In most countries, demand deposits account for a majority of the
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money supply. To explain the correlation between deposit (demand deposit)
and money supply, bank runs can be interpreted as the sudden constraint of
deposit and money supply. We research on indicators of economic crisis so
economic crisis is not the indicator to analyse the status of economy.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) assume that the uniqueness of demand deposits
roles as a desirable medium of exchange so the existence of demand for
privately produced riskless trading securities induces issuing demand deposits
by banks. Actually, under the fractional reserve banking, a bank deposit is not
a bailment that implies physical possession of personal property. It moves
safely upon the banking revenue process,
Firstly, the property of customer was deposited. In turn, the customer receives
an asset called the deposit account. Finally, The deposit account is the
liability of the bank on its balance sheet. On the balance sheet of Liabilities of
all commercial banks in the United States (2014.01), 70% is the deposit
account. The circulation of deposits is important in economy. David Vanhoose
(2010) categories the deposit into three sections like transaction deposit,
large-denomination time deposit, savings deposits and small-denomination
time deposits, at the United States commercial bank liability and equity
capital. Transaction deposit contains non-interest-bearing demand deposits.
Transaction deposit is 6% among total liabilities and equity capital of bank
balance sheet.
Dewatripont-Tirole (2012) points out that deposit insurance is the prevention
of banks runs following the Diamond-Dybvig (1983). In the model of
Boyd-Chang-Smith (2004), even though project return is safe because of a
large number of borrowers, he assumes possibility for banks to fail. Regardless
of a single borrower and aggregate of borrower, potential bankers can suggest
needless to operate the bank. In the model of Covas-Fujita (2010), the bank
can raise funds through either deposits or equity so holding equity involves the
equity issuance cost.
15
Diaz model (2005) also try to select the considerable sources. For example,
firms only source of financing is bank lending the bank can claim the full
amount of firm’s cash flow. bank equity motion, upper limit of dividend (under
the hypothesis that the bank can turn equity into dividend with restriction),
balance sheet constraint. Goodhart-Kashrap-Tsomocos (2012) mentioned
shadow banking. The securitized loans, called mortgage backed securities
(MBS) can be sold to the non-bank and the non-bank will finance the purchase
with an repo loan from the bank (that will have the MBS as collateral).
4. Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium
The Federal Reserve Banks chooses its investment level I and its financing
(through real asset Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , liabilities to bank
Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Lfr (or Liabilities to central bank Lfr) in a way that
maximizes its profit:
Max Πf (Pf )
Πf=f(I) + rf (Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s )− rLBank(Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsBh − Lfr)− rLfrLfr
I = Sh
Where f denotes the production function of the representative firm. rf is the
premium of firm real asset. rLBank , rLfr is the interest rate on bank loans and
federal reserve bank loan. Dh denotes for bank deposits. Bhs denotes for
securities. Especially Bfrs denotes for securities of federal reserve banks. Lfr is
loan claimed by the firm to the federal reserve bank. For each future state of
the world s (s ∈ ω) one can determine the price Ps of the contingent claim
that pays one unit of account in state s and nothing otherwise. I is the
investment level and Sh denotes for savings.
Interior Solution Pf has an interior solution only when: rf = rLBank = rLfr
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5. General Equilibrium
General equilibrium is characterized by a vector of interest rates (r, rD, rh, rf ,
rLBank , rLfr ) and three vectors of demand and supply levels (C1, C2,∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , D
h) for the consumer, (I,
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , Dh, Lfr) for the firm,
(Lfr,
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , Dh, Lfr,
∑
s∈Ω PsB
fr
s ) for the bank, and (Dh,∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s , Lfr) for the federal reserve banks
Each agent behaves optimally (i.e., his or her decisions solve Ph, Pf , or Pb
respectively.
Each market clearing
I=S (Good market)
Dh(Firm)-Dh(Firm)+Dh(Household)-Dh(Household)+Dh(Bank)-Dh(Bank)
(Deposit market)
Lfr(Firm)-Lfr(Firm)-Lfr(Bank)+Lfr(Firm)+Lfr(FR)-Lfr(FR) (Credit
market)
Bhs (Firm)-B
h
s (Firm)+B
h
s (Household)-B
h
s (Household)+B
fr
s (Bank)-
Bfrs (Bank)+B
fr
s (FR)-B
fr
s (FB) (Financial
market)
It is clear in this model that the only possible equilibrium is such that all
interest rates are equal: r=rL=rD
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(result) Arrow (1953)
If firms and households have unrestricted access to perfect financial markets,
then at the competitive equilibrium
(result) Cho (2014)
If the sume accumulated variables is not negative, for example, the
components Investment I, Savings Sh, Lfr are not negative, there is the
equilibrium in the economy and the existence of each factors like firms,
Househoulds, Banks, Federal Reserve Banks is fulfilled. The size of banks is
affecting on each agent because equity capitals depend on previous deposits.
Depending the change of bank size influencing on total deposit Dh, the
liability of firms is affected by liabilities to banks Dh +
∑
s∈Ω PsB
h
s − Lfr,
deposit of household Dh and real asset of household and firms. This is
supported by the following the process of equity capital multiplication.
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Part IV
How we can induce the moral
hazard problem?
we can assume optimal consumption profile with the Autarky concern (no
trade) and trade condition. Then, we check that the market economy does not
provide perfect insurance against liquidity shocks, and therefore does not lead
to an efficient allocation of resources. By the crucial assumption is that no
individual withdraw at earlier period if he or she does not have to. Hence, we
induce why the moral hazard problem occurs.
Irving Fisher developed the theory of intertemporal choice in his book Theory
of interest (1930). Contrary to Keynes, who related consumption to current
income, Fisher’s model showed how rational forward looking consumers choose
consumption for the present and future to maximize their lifetime satisfaction.
According to Fisher, an individual’s impatience depends on four characteristics
of his income stream: the size, the time shape, the composition and risk.
Besides this, foresight, self-control, habit, expectation of life, and bequest
motive (or concern for lives of others) are the five personal factors that
determine a person’s impatience which in turn determines his time preference.
6. Autarky concerns
The simplest case, in which there is no trade between agents, is called
”autarky”.
Each agent chooses independently the quantity I that will be invested in the
illiquid technology, assumed to be perfectly divisible. If he has to consume
early, then this investment will be liquidated at t = 1, yielding
C1 = 1− I + LI = 1− I(1− L) is equivalent or less than 1 Consumer can
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liquidate investment I and re-invest LI.
On the contrary, if he has to consume late, he obtains profit R about
Investment I. Hence, he get RI
C2 = 1− I +RI = 1 + I(R− 1) is equivalent or less than R
With equality only when I = 1
In autarky, each consumer will select the consumption profile that maximizes
his ex-ante utility u under the constrains C1 and C2
7. Market Economy - With trade
If agents are allowed to trade, welfare improves. In this simple context, it is
enough to open a financial market at t = 1 in which agents can trade the good
at t = 1 against a riskless bond (that is promised to receive some quantity of
the consumption good at t = 2). Let p denote the price of the bond at t = 1
which, by convention, yields one units of good at t = 2. Clearly p is less than
or equal to 1 ; otherwise people would prefer to store. By investing I at t = 0,
an agent can now obtain
C1 = 1− I + pRI
If she needs to consume early (in which case she will sell RI bonds). If, on the
contrary, she needs to consume late, she will obtain
C2 =
p
1− I +RI =
p
1
(1− I + pRI)
Since she can then buy
1− I
p
bonds at t = 1 and I can be freely chosen by
agents, the only possible equilibrium price is p =
1
R
. Otherwise either an
excess supply or an excess demand of bonds will occur (I = +∞) if p > 1R
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The equilibrium allocation of the market economy is therefore CM1 = 1,
CM2 = R and the corresponding investment level is I
M = Π2. Notice that this
market allocation Pareto dominates the autarky allocation. Since there is no
liquidation. In addition, it is not ex-ante Pareto optimal.
8. Optimal allocation
From an ex-ante viewpoint, there is a unique symmetric Pareto Optimal
Allocation (C∗1 , C
∗
2 ) obtained by solving
max Π1u(C1) + ρΠ2u(C2)
Π1C1 + Π2
C2
R
= 1
L=Π1u(C1) + ρΠ2u(C2)− λ(1−Π1C1 + Π2C2
R
)
∂L
∂C1
= 0
∂L
∂C2
= 0
Π1u′(C1) + λ[Pi1C1] = 0
ρΠ2u′(C2) + λ[
Pi2
C1
] = 0
This optimal allocation satisfies in particular the first-order condition: u’(C∗1 )=
ρRu’C∗2 Therefore, except in the very peculiar case in which u’(1)=ρRu’(R),
The market allocation (CM1 =1, C
M
2 =R ) is not Pareto optimal. In particular,
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume that C −→ Cu’(C) is decreasing. In that
case, since R>1, ρRu′(R) < ρu′(1) < u′(1), and the market allocation can be
Pareto improved by increasing CM1 and decreasing C
M
2 :
CM1 = 1 < C
∗
1 ; C
M
2 = R > C
∗
2
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The market economy does not provide perfect insurance against liquidity
shocks, and therefore does not lead to an efficient allocation of resources.
9. Financial Intermediation (”FI” as below)
Provided the possibility of strategic behavior of depositors is ruled out, the
Pareto optimal allocation (C∗1 , C
∗
2 ) can be implemented very easily by a
financial intermediary who offers a demand deposit contract stipulated as
follows:
In exchange for a deposit of one unit at t = 0, individuals can get either C∗1 at
t = 1 or C∗2 at t = 2. In order to fulfill its obligation, the FI stores Π1C
∗
1 and
invests the rest in the illiquid techonology. Thus we have established the
following:
(result) In an economy in which agents are individually subject to independent
liquidity shocks, the market allocation can be improved by a deposit contract
offered by a financial intermediary.
The reason why the market allocation is not Pareto optimal is that complete
contingent markets cannot exist: the state of economy (i.e., the complete list
of the consumers who need to consume early) is not observable by anyone.
The only (noncontingent) financial market that can be opened (namely the
bond market) is not sufficient to obtain efficient risk sharing.
Notice that a crucial assumption is that no individual withdraw at t = 1 if he
or she does not have to. Provided ρR > 1, this assumption is not
unreasonable, since it corresponds to a Nash equilibrium behavior. The
first-order condition of the optimal allocation implies ( since ρR ≥ 1 ) that
C∗1 < C
∗
2 : in other words, a deviation by a single late consumer (withdraw at
t = 1 and store the good until t = 2) is never in that consumer’s own interest.
Also, another Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium exists in which deviations of
all late consumers occur simultaneously.
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In this simple setup, an FI cannot coexist with a financial market. Indeed if
there is a bond market at t = 1, the equilibrium price is necessarily p=
1
R
.
then the optimal allocation (C∗1 , C
∗
2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium anymore:
RC∗1 > R > C
∗
2
10. The Moral Hazard Issue
Related to the moral hazard, we can simply start with the static model with
only two period k and k + 1. At k + 1, the deposit insurance premium is paid
by the bank. At t = 1, the bank is liquidated, and depositors are compensated
whenever the bank’s assets are insufficient. For simplicity, the riskless rate (and
the deposit rate) is normalized to zero. The balance sheets of the banks are as
below:
Assets (t = 0) Liabilities (t = 0)
Loans L Deposits D
Insurance premium P Equity F
Assets (t = 1) Liabilities (t = 1)
Loan Repayments L˜ Deposits D
Insurance Payment S˜ Liquidation Value V˜
At date 1, the stockholders receive the liquidation value of the bank: V˜ =
BankAsset − Deposits + RecoveredDeposits = L˜ − D + S˜ where S˜ is the
payment received from deposit insurance: S˜ = max(0, D− L˜ using the balance
sheet at date 0 to replace D, V˜ can also been written as V˜ = F + (L˜ − L) +
[max(0, D− L˜)−P ] thus the value of equity will be the sum of its initial value,
the increase in the value of loans, and the net subsidy (positive or negative) from
the deposit insurance. suppose, for instance, that L˜ can take only two values:
X with probability θ (success) and 0 with probability (1 − θ) (failure). The
expected profit for the bank’s stockholders will be pi := E(V˜ −F = (θX −L) +
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((1 − θ)D − P ), where the first term represents the Net Present Value (NPV)
of the loans and the second term is the net subsidy from the deposit insurance
system. If deposit insurance is fairly priced, this term is nil (P = (1−θ)D), and
the strong form of the Modigliani-Miller result obtains: the market value of firm,
E(V˜ ) +D, is independent of its liability structure. The moral hazard problem
is easily captured from this formula. Suppose that P is fixed and that banks
are free to determine the characteristic (θ, X) of the projects they finance in a
given feasible set. Then, within a class of projects with the same NPV (θX-L =
constant),the banks will choose those with the lowest probability of success θ (or
the highest risk). This comes from the fact that the premium rate
P
D
is given,
and does not depend on the risk taken by the bank. Such a ”flat” rate deposit
insurance pricing was in place in the United States until December 1991, when
Congress legislated a new system involving risk-rated insurance premiums.
Part V
Effects of Equity Capital
Regulation
11. The Countercyclical Buffer - The portfolio composition effected
by the minimum equity capital regulation
In the model of Kahane (1977), the minimum capital requirement causes an
unintended result: it worsened, rather than improved the intermediary’s
condition and increases its probability of ruin. He check this calculation with
the ruin constraint and given standard deviation of rate of return at the
portfolio composition of liability, stock and bonds.
In this paper, with the portfolio of risky portfolio and stable portfolio,
explanation will be easier to be understood why minimum equity regulation
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induces for banks to operate riskier portfolio. In addition, it intends to reduce
procyclicality (to the financial shocks) and promote the countercyclical buffer.
If we assume that the bank manages a risky portfolio with an expected rate of
return of 17% and a standard deviation of 27%. The expected rate of return
on equity is 7%. and even though, there is pressure to raise the required equity
every period, liability is same every period. The bank try to meet the bank
capital condition regulated by the financial intermediaries, the bank should
operate much more riskier portfolio comparing to the previous period as
following.
Effects of increasing the equity at the portfolio composition
Period Required Equity, Liability Portfolio composition
(risky portfolio, stable portfolio)
1 12 (12%), 88(88%) (-61.6%, 161.6%)
2 13 (13%), 88(87.12%) (-61 %, 161 %)
3 14 (14%), 88(86.72%) (-60.4 %, 160.4 %)
To calculate the portfolio composition, we calculate the expected value (Mean).
Mean 0.12(12/100)× 0.07 + 0.88× 0 = 0.0084
0.1287(13/101)× 0.07 + 0.8712× 0 = 0.0090
0.1372(14/102)× 0.07 + 0.8672× 0 = 0.0096
Suppose that the bank decides to invest in the portfolio having a proportion Y
of the total investment budget so that the overall portfolio will have an
expected rate of return as above.
We know an expected rate of return of a risky portfolio Rp is 17% and an
expected rate of return of a stable portfolio is 7%. Hence, we get the risky
portfolio proportion Y.
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Rf + (Rp −Rf ))× Y Proportion Y
0.07 + 0.1× Y = 0.0084 -0.616
0.07 + 0.1× Y = 0.0090 -0.61
0.07 + 0.1× Y = 0.0096 -0.604
Thus, in order to obtain a mean return of 0.84%, 0.90%, 0.96%, the bank must
invest -61.6%, -61%, -60.4 of total funds in the risky portfolio and 161.6%,
161%, 160.4% in stable portfolio.
Standard deviation which implies the probability to get mean return, is also
increasing.
Standard Deviation
0.12× 0.27 = 0.0324
0.13× 0.27 = 0.0351
0.14× 0.27 = 0.0378
12. Deposit affects optimized equity capital
n Deposits Borrowings OptimizedEquityCapital
n = 0 D0 = 1 - -
n = 1 D1 = (1− β −K) B1 = (1− β) OEC1 = K
n = 2 D2 = (1− β −K)2 B2 = (1− β)(1− β −K) OEC2 = K(1− β −K)
n = 3 D3 = (1− β −K)3 B3 = (1− β)(1− β −K)2 OEC3 = K(1− β −K)2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
n = k Dk = (1− β −K)k Bk = (1− β)(1− β −K)k−1 OECk = K(1− β −K)k−1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
n→∞ D∞ = 0 B∞ = 0 OEC∞ = 0
total deposits total borrowings total optimized equity capital
D =
1
K + β
B =
1− β
K + β
OEC =
K
K + β
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[β = restriction of borrowing] Then, Borrowings can be executed between
Deposit 1 and Restriction β
[balance sheet equality constraint] Dn = Bn −OECn
Hart and Jaffee(1974) analyzed the properties of the feasible and efficient set
with the assumption that the initial equity capital is zero (i.e. K=0).
However, it is possible that the intermediary’s equity is zero in the substantial
degrees of leverage (high liabilities to equity ratios
EquityCapital
Dh +Bfr − Lfr ). Then,
we should assume that the equity is negligible.
In the paper, following the KAHANE (1977), we assume the equity is positive
(K > 0) so that the opportunity set does not pass through the origin (i.e. the
vector of Deposit D, Borrowing B, Optimized Equity Capital = 0 give an
infeasible solution).
Then the theoretical superior limit for deposits is defined by the following:
Deposits=
∑∞
n=0[(1−K− β)] =
1
K + β
Theoretically, superior limit for the equity capital by the firm is defined by the
following:
OptimizedEquityCapital = K×Deposits = K
K + β
and the theoretical superior limit for total borrowings in banks is defined by
the following:
Borrowings = (1− β)×Deposits = 1− β
K + β
The process described above by the geometric series can be represented, where
Borrowings at stage k are a function of the deposits at the precedent stage:
Bk = (1− β −K)×Dk−1
Optimized Equity Capital at stage k is a function of the deposits at the
precedent stage: OECk = K×Dk−1
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Hence, if the optimized equity capital depends on the initial deposit and
assume the terminal condition of bank is liquidation of bank deposits,
(result) Hence, Optimized Equity Capital depends on the previous deposit.
In addition, deposit insurance cost also increases because deposit insurance
depends on the number of household.
Deposits at stage k are the difference between additional borrowings and
optimized equity capital relative to the same stage: Dk = Bk −OECk
In the model of Gorton-Winton (1995), bank size is given. In the theorem of
Modigliani-Miller, the size and composition of banks’ balance sheets have no
impact on other agents. However, as population grows, insured deposits will
increase. Then, the bank size should grow so bank size growth concern should
be measured.
13. k index for the indicator of risk taking
Define the equity capital ratio with respect to total liabilities and equity
capital,
EquityCapital
Dh +Bfr − Lfr , K ∈ (0, 1), the borrowing (from the federal banks)
ratio
Bfr − Lfr
Dh +Bfr − Lfr , β ∈ (0, 1); suppose the demand for funds is unlimited;
By summing up two quantities, the theoretical equity capital multiplier is
defined as
k =
Deposits + OptimizedEquityCapital
Borrowings + OptimizedEquityCapital
=
1 + K
K + β
where the equity capital ratio with respect to total liabilities and equity
capital,
EquityCapital
Dh +Bfr − Lfr , the borrowing (from the federal banks) ratio
Bfr − Lfr
Dh +Bfr − Lfr
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k is the index to decline to increase the risk at the portfolio of commercial
banks. The deposit is fixed at total 1 and borrowings have the constraint can
not be negative value beyond the minimum borrowings β. For example, if
deposit=1, the minimum of required equity = 10%, borrowings = 0.3
1 + 0.1
0.3 + 0.1
=
1.1
0.4
= 2.75
If the minimum of required equity is raised from 10%, to 15%, k index was
downed as below.
1 + 0.15
0.3 + 0.15
=
1.15
0.45
= 2.55
To increase the k index, the bank should increase the deposit beyond the
initial deposit level (1 in this simulation) or allocate the borrowing portfolio.
14. Conclusion
The minimum capital requirement is a necessary condition for banking sector
stability to raise the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base.
However, it has friction with the portfolio management. By using effects of
increasing the equity at the portfolio composition, reducing procyclicality (to
the financial shocks) and promoting the countercyclical buffer are pursued.
In the Basel 3 system, The risk coverage framework intends to capture all
material risks by using counterparty credit risk formula weighted on the
external rating of the counter party. Exposure measures contain on-balance
sheet, repurchase agreements and securities finance, derivatives and off-balance
sheet (OBS) items. In the paper, rather than enlarging the risk contagion,
related factors and risk affection scope are detected without overstatement by
using the general equilibrium model and deposit affection to the optimized
equity capital. Deposits are in the large portion at the household, firm and
banks. To explain risk coverage, by proving correlation of optimized equity
capital upon the previous deposit level, the paper aims to ensure that banking
sector capital requirements take account of the macro-financial environment in
which each substantial economic entities operate.
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Basel 3 introduced a minimum leverage ratio. the leverage ratio was calculated
by dividing Tier1 capital by the bank’s average total consolidated assets. In
the paper, k index is suggested as the indicator of risk taking. Within the
liability, three major fractions like deposits, borrowings and optimized equity
capital are considered as the complementary of minimum capital requirement.
Assets of commercial banks are mainly consisted with loans and securities.
Because the optimized equity capital grows and deposits is restricted by
change, borrowings which is the difference between asset and deposit+equity
capital should be checked whether borrowings can cover the optimized equity
by k index.
The combination of portfolio composition test, deposit-equity optimization
and k index enables bounding the bank capital regulation problems.
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